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1. Introduction 
 
Manufacturing  exports  have  been  a  key  driver  of  the  rapid  East  Asian  economic  
transformation.  Countries, notably China, South Korea, Vietnam among others, moved 
from largely agrarian, low-productivity economies to industrial, high-productivity 
global players.  This route from the farms to the factories was paved by the global trade 
in modern sector products. 
 
While East Asia grew at a stark pace, Sub-Saharan Africa’s (henceforth Africa) growth 
performance and broader economic development have been largely disappointing.  In 
the 1960’s, the average African income per capita was at the level of its East Asian 
neighbors, if not slightly higher.  Today, average incomes are manifold higher in East 
Asia.  Indeed, African incomes have largely stagnated over the last five decades, though 
with some promising signs over the last decade in many countries.1 
 
Figure 1:  Evolution of Incomes:  East Asia vs. Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: World Bank World Databank 2012 
 
There are a variety of different explanations for the miraculous growth of East Asia, 
depending on who one asks.  High savings rates, relatively well-managed industrial 
policy, technology transfer from the West, investment in infrastructure and education 
were all part of the success.  This thesis will not seek to explain the Asian miracle, but 
                                                             
1 Radelet (2010) 
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rather  focus  on  the  role  of  exchange  rate  policy  in  the  transformation  and  its  
implications for Africa.  Rodrik (2009) and others argue that undervalued currencies 
have been a crucial factor in spurring the boom in manufactured exports in many high-
growth East Asian countries.  Could this be part of the answer for Africa? 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Chapter two examines the economic literature on 
manufacturing and its role in economic development.  It explores the current situation in 
the sector across Africa and highlights the thinking on what is constraining this 
important segment of the economy.  The next chapter delves into the role of exchange 
rates in the development process, examining the theory and empirical evidence for the 
effects of exchange rates in promoting the manufactured export sector and broader 
economic growth.  This section introduces the various methods for estimating exchange 
rate misalignment and discusses key issues related to the measurement.   
 
Chapters four and five introduce two theoretical models which illustrate the 
mechanisms behind the currency undervaluation and growth relationship.  The first 
model, developed by Rodrik (2009), builds on the assumption that the export sector is 
affected more acutely by institutional weaknesses than the domestic production sector 
and an undervalued currency acts as a second-best solution in addressing these 
weaknesses.  The second model, developed by Korinek and Severn (2010), is more 
comprehensive, looking at the welfare effects of undervaluation through foreign reserve 
accumulation and the importance of learning-by-investing effects in the export sector. 
 
In chapter six, the thesis turns from the theoretical to the subject at hand: could 
exchange rate undervaluation be a sensible policy option for African economies?  This 
section  looks  briefly  at  the  history  of  exchange  rate  policy  in  Africa  and  presents  
estimates of the misalignment of currencies at present.  Policy options are explored and 
their impact on spurring manufactured exports is analyzed.  Chapter seven concludes.   
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2. Manufactured exports: Why they matter and how Africa is 
progressing 
 
2.1. Manufactured exports and development 
 
To understand why manufactured exports are often so critical to robust and sustainable 
economic growth, one must first break down this compound into its two elements: 
manufacturing and exports.  One of the first seminal theories of development economics, 
authored by Nobel-prize winning economist Arthur Lewis, was the dual-sector model.  
In the model, economic development is explained by the structural shift of moving 
surplus labor from the low-productivity agricultural sector into the higher productivity 
modern sector.   Unlike the largely subsistence agriculture sector in Lewis’ model, the 
modern sector can reinvest profits productively, spurring economic growth.2  Another 
crucial  part  is  the  even  older  Engel’s  Law.   Ernst  Engels,  a  19th century German 
statistician, observed that as income rises, the share of expenditure dedicated to food 
decreases.  In other words, the income elasticity of demand for food is less than one.3  
An economy which relies on agricultural output will quickly hit a ceiling as the demand 
for food is relatively finite.  Prebisch and Singer formalized this idea into formal 
economic  theory.   The  Prebisch-Singer  thesis  extends  Engel’s  argument  to  include  all  
primary products (not just agriculture), and contends that the income elasticity for 
manufactured goods will be higher than for primary commodities.4   
 
The same is true on a global level.  Primary commodity-focused economies can supply 
the global market, increasing their income, but what is true on the country level is true 
on the global level: demand for primary goods is relatively inelastic, and eventually 
increasing supply will push down prices and subsequently incomes.  Manufactured 
goods, especially on the global market, have much higher income elasticties of demand, 
meaning the room for income generation is vastly greater.  Manufactured products are 
significantly more diverse and the output can expand both on the intensive (increasing 
volumes through productivity gains) and extensive (increasing product varieties through 
investment in innovation) margins contributing significantly more value addition than 
                                                             
2 Lewis (1954) 
3 Zimmerman (1932) 
4 Singer (1998).   
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primary products.  Further, manufacturing tends to be less vulnerable to global business 
cycles than natural resources which can exhibit high price volatility.5 
 
Important political economy arguments must also be considered.  The manufacturing 
sector creates significantly more employment than natural resource extraction and at 
better wages than agriculture.6  Increasing returns to skills in manufacturing promote the 
demand for education, a key factor for long-term growth.  Unlike with natural resources, 
manufacturing does not create enormous rents and therefore the government must rely 
on taxation of the firms, and provide public services in return.  In essence, 
manufacturing can create a virtuous cycle of improvement in the political institutions 
and the public incentive to keep these institutions clean.   
 
Clearly the internal structure of an economy matters to development, but what about the 
role of exporting?  Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) compare what a country 
exports to its economic performance.  The authors create an index (EXPY) for each 
country’s export basket of goods which ranks goods according to the income levels of 
the countries that export them.  In other words, primarily developed countries goods, 
which generally tend to be higher-value added products, are at the top of the spectrum, 
while goods exported by low income countries, primarily low-value added, are at the 
bottom.   They  find  that  a  10% increase  in  a  country’s  EXPY index  correlates  with  an  
increase in GDP growth of 0.5%.7  In other words, exporting higher value added goods 
is associated with stronger economic growth.  Further, the authors argue that this is not 
due to endogenous factors, rather “EXPY exerts an independent force on economic 
growth  and  that  it  is  not  a  proxy  for  the  factor  or  institutional  endowments  of  a  
country.”8  Paraphrasing the title of the article, what you export matters. 
 
Indeed, expanding into global markets can induce stronger firm performance through a 
number of channels.  First, the global market is an order of magnitude larger than any 
domestic market, even in the case of China, the world’s second largest economy.  
International markets present a significant increase in the potential customer base.  
Looking at the performance of Chinese manufacturing firms between 1995-2000, Park 
                                                             
5 Taylor (2009), p.3 
6 Mijiyawa (2012) 
7 Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007),  p.18 
8 Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007),  p.20 
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et al. (2010) find that a 10% increase in a firm’s exports correlates on average with an 
increase of 6-7% in the firm’s sales.  Similarly, Van Biesebrock (2006) examines micro-
level data on manufacturing firms in Africa and finds that past export activity raises 
current output by 25%.9  Indeed, this argument is of particular interest for African 
countries with often very small markets given the low average per capita incomes on the 
continent.   
 
Secondly, the empirical evidence is quite consistent in showing that export-oriented 
firms are more efficient than domestic-oriented firms.10  For example, Aw et al. (2000) 
find that Taiwanese and South Korean exporters had total factor productivity levels 10% 
to 30% higher (depending on which sector) than non-exporting firms in the same 
industry. 11   Equally importantly, these productivity differences trickle down into 
increasing incomes: Aw and Batra (1995) find that Taiwanese export-oriented firms 
paid 14% to 30% higher wages than comparable domestically-oriented counterparts.12 
 
Though economists agree exporting firms are more productive, the literature is not of 
one  mind  on  what  drives  these  productivity  differences.   One  line  of  reasoning  is  that  
the most efficient firms enter the global markets precisely because they are the most 
productive: there is a self-selection process which drives the apparent productivity 
differences.13  This seems to be especially true for developed countries, as studies on 
exporting and firm performance from the US, Canada and several European countries 
show.14  However, there is more conclusive evidence that developing countries, which 
are often far away from the global technological frontier, benefit directly from entering 
exports.  In other words, there is a direct causal relationship between exports and 
productivity gains.   
 
This increased productivity can be driven by two mechanisms.  First, as mentioned 
earlier, access to new markets can increase firm sales and production.  Increasing 
production can allow firms to exploit technical advantages stemming from economies of 
scale.   Van  Biesebrock  estimates  that  50%  of  the  productivity  premium  of  African  
                                                             
9 Van Biesebroeck (2005),  p. 386 
10 Söderbom and Teal (2001), Aw et al. (2000), Kraay (1999), Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1995) among others 
11 Aw et al. (2000),  p.11 
12 Aw and Batra (2000) 
13 Bernard and Jensen (1995), Clerides et al (1998) among others   
14 Martins and Yang (2009).  p.436 
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exporters (vs. non-exporters) can be explained by this effect.15  Indeed, his findings 
show that the productivity gap increases when the firms begin exporting, showing that 
there is more than simply self-selection at work.   
 
The second mechanism is the so-called learning-by-exporting effect.  An extension of 
Kenneth Arrow’s learning-by-doing theory 16 , firms increase productivity from 
interacting with international buyers and from the more competitive nature of operating 
in the global marketplace.  International buyers demand higher quality, low-cost goods 
and often share proprietary information or technology with the suppliers.17  Firms can 
also pick up on global trends in demand and new production tools.  Empirical evidence 
is mixed in support of this argument, though Martins and Yang (2009) argue 
disaggregating the data paints a more conclusive picture.  Reviewing 30 recent 
empirical studies on learning from exporting, the authors find that there is strong 
evidence for learning from exporting for developing country firms, while not for firms 
from developed countries.18  This is in line with economic theory: developing country 
firms tend to be less technically sophisticated and further from the global technology 
frontier.  Hence, these firms have more to gain from interacting internationally, 
especially with developed country buyers (an “advantage of backwardness”).  Bigsten et 
al. (2004) confirm this finding using firm-level panel data from four African countries: 
exporters increase productivity as a direct result of exporting.19  Mengistae and Patillo 
(2004)  show  a  similar  finding:  firms  exporting  outside  of  Africa  tend  to  be  more  
productive than those exporting within Africa.  This is consistent with the learning-by-
exporting  theory,  as  the  potentials  for  technological  diffusion  is  greater  with  more  
developed countries.20 
 
Finally, a broader political economy argument must be revisited.  Manufactured exports 
have markedly different effects on the political structure and incentives for politicians 
than natural resource exports.  Manufacturing tends to create significantly more 
employment than resource extraction, which helps to broaden the middle class.  The 
middle class, with more incentive to participate in the political system, demand more 
                                                             
15 Van Biesebroeck (2005),  p. 392 
16 Arrow (1962) 
17 World Bank (1993) 
18 Martins and Yang (2009) 
19 Bigsten et al.(2004),  p. 133 
20 Mengistae and Patillo (2004), p.1 
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accountable government (partly as they are now tax payers) which helps to create a 
virtuous  cycle  of  improved  government.   Revenues  from  the  extraction  and  export  of  
natural resources, on the other hand, tend not to create significant employment 
opportunities for local labor.  For example, the Nigerian oil sector, which accounts for 
close to 40% of the country’s GDP, only contributes 1% of total modern sector 
employment.21  Instead of wages to workers, the revenues accrued are rents to the 
government.  These rents often create a damaging political environment, with leaders 
focused on capturing these rents, rather than providing public services.  Given that these 
rents reduce the incentive for the government to tax its citizens, ordinary people have 
less incentive to try to hold the government to account, creating this time a vicious 
circle, often referred to as the natural resource curse.   
 
Johnson, Ostrey and Subramanian (2007) – an important paper which will be an 
important  aspect  of  2.3  as  well  –  show  that  countries  whose  growth  relied  on  
manufacturing exports saw significant improvements in the quality of their institutions, 
while those whose growth derived from natural resource exports saw no improvement.22  
In other words, the structure of the economy and the incentives it can create for private 
and public agents are fundamental for the long-term development of an economy.   
 
2.2. What does Africa make?  What does it export? 
 
Real GDP in Africa has grown by an average of 5.5% between 2000 and 2010, more 
than double the average growth rate from 1980 to 1995.23  However, structurally the 
economy of the continent has not progressed.  Indeed, industry has declined both as a 
share of global production and trade.24  In 2005, African manufacturing value-added 
totaled USD 45.8 billion, of which almost 60% was accounted for by one country - 
South Africa.25  Indeed, excluding South Africa, manufacturing valued added was less 
than USD 30 per capita (and making up on average less than 8% of GDP), compared to 
USD 82 for South Asia (15% of GDP) and USD 583 (30% of GDP) for East Asia and 
the Pacific.26   
                                                             
21 Akinlo (2012), p.168 
22 Johnson, Ostrey and Subramanian (2007),  p.13 
23 IMF (2011),  p. 15 
24 Page (2010),  p.1 
25 UNIDO (2009).  p.132 
26 Ibid, p. 136 
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Table 1:  Top 10, Manufacturing Value Added (2009) 
              Country Value Added (USD) 
1. South Africa 38 845 723 101 
2. Angola 4 586 022 590 
3. Cote d'Ivoire 4 186 697 615 
4. Sudan 3 511 954 528 
5. Kenya 2 801 459 948 
6. Tanzania 1 844 077 853 
7. Ghana 1 759 227 712 
8. Equatorial Guinea 1 641 302 368 
9. Senegal 1 489 884 157 
10. Mauritius 1 483 299 956 
Source: World Bank World Databank 2012 
Table 2:  Top 10, Manufacturing Value Added as % of GDP (2009) 
               Country % of GDP 
1. Swaziland 44,7 
2. Mauritius 19,4 
3. Cote d'Ivoire 18,2 
4. Zimbabwe 17,0 
5. Lesotho 16,0 
6. South Africa 15,2 
7. Namibia 14,7 
8. Madagascar 14,1 
9. Mozambique 13,6 
10. Equatorial Guinea 13,6 
Source: World Bank World Databank 2012 
 
In terms of exports, manufactured goods have grown by an average of 13% in Africa 
(roughly  the  same rate  when South  Africa  is  excluded),  though from a  very  low base.   
In 2005, Africa exported USD 58 billion in manufactures, of which 55% was accounted 
for by South Africa. 27   East Asia, in comparison, exported USD 1.8 trillion in 
manufactured  goods,  ten  times  more  per  capita  than  Africa  and  twenty  times  more  if  
South Africa is excluded. 28   Looking at the level of sophistication of African 
manufactured exports (exc. South Africa), 75% were resource-based (e.g. timber) and 
only 13% were medium or high-technology goods.29  In the 2011 Regional Outlook, the 
IMF finds the overall level of sophistication of Africa’s merchandise exports has been 
quite static.  Indeed, the “success stories” in moving up the value chain tend to be 
                                                             
27 UNIDO (2009),  p. 113 
28 Ibid,  p. 136 
29 Ibid,  p. 134 
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agricultural goods, such as cut flowers and coffee.30  According to UNIDO figures, 
manufactures have increased as a share of exports over the last several decades, though 
this reflects largely the decline in primary product prices rather than a boom in 
manufacturing.31 
 
Table 3:  Top 10, Manufactured Exports per Capita (2009) 
               Country USD 
1. Botswana 1 360 
2. Mauritius 976 
3. South Africa 594 
4. Gabon 168 
5. Cote d'Ivoire 86 
6. Senegal 69 
7. Zimbabwe 62 
8. Ghana 60 
9. Kenya 41 
10. Madagascar 30 
Source: World Bank World Databank 2012, author’s calculations 
 
 
Looking at where African manufacturers export is also illuminating.  Looking at firm 
survey data from seven African countries, Yoshino (2008) finds that firms exporting 
within a sub-region are likely to expand to other markets within Africa, but not to global 
markets.  Those firms that export outside of Africa (e.g. to Europe which imports 
roughly half of Africa’s manufactured exports) are likely to expand to other non-African 
markets, but not within the continent.  In other words, “little overlap is found between 
intra-Africa regional exporters and exporters to countries outside Africa.”32 
 
Another interesting finding from earlier work is that most large African manufacturing 
firms  (with  100  employees  or  more)  do  export,  but  export  small  amounts  (on  average  
less than 30% of output).33  Given the relatively small size of African markets, this 
finding has important implications.  If the large firms are able to break into export 
markets, why have they not expanded their presence, through expanding the volume of 
their  output  exported?   Bigsten  et  al  (1999)  venture  that  African  firms  do  not  want  to  
specialize as this carries more risk, though they offer no concrete conclusion.   
                                                             
30 IMF (2011),  p. 49 
31 Lawrence (2005),  p.1   
32 Yoshino (2008),  p. 22 
33 Bigsten et al (1999),  p. 56 
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2.3. What’s preventing Africa’s manufactured export growth? 
 
To understand the current situation, it is useful to set the background of modern 
manufacturing in Africa.  Following the wave of independence in the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s, many African economies turned to import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) programs in an effort to promote domestic industries to get off the ground.  
Though initially well-intentioned, in general these efforts created highly inefficient 
oligopolies which tended to lose significant amounts of money. Lawrence (2005) argues 
that these programs were not part of a well-structured industrial plan, rather “a 
dependent and unplanned industrialization linking domestic manufacturing to foreign 
investors/suppliers, mainly multinational companies.”34  Manufacturers were dependent 
on foreign inputs; even when domestic sources could be exploited, creating larger and 
larger demand for foreign exchange while simultaneously reducing the economic logic 
of domestic production.  The lack of technical absorption capacity and negotiating 
power (or perhaps, will) on the side of the government resulted in little positive 
spillovers from the foreign technology and in general, repatriation of a significant share 
of  profits.   Lawrence’s  over-arching  explanation  for  this  rests  on  the  absence  of  a  
capitalist class; in its place was a ruling political elite more focused on consumption and 
rent-seeking.35   
 
Turning from political economy explanations to applications of trade theory, different 
arguments have been presented to the lack of manufacturing export dynamism.  The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade hypothesizes that what a country exports 
depends on its factor endowments, most commonly labor and capital.  Wood and Mayer 
(2001) use this model to explain Africa’s propensity to export primary rather than 
manufactured goods.  The authors argue that Africa’s low level of skilled labor and high 
level of land resources gives it a comparative advantage in unprocessed primary 
products.  However, given the discussion earlier on the growth implications of relying 
on primary goods, this model predicts a rather pessimistic view for Africa’s future.  
More  importantly,  there  is  a  body of  data  which  shows that  education  levels  found in  
Africa today, though far from developed country standards, are not appreciably different 
                                                             
34 Lawrence (2005),  p. 1127 
35 Ibid,  p. 1130 
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from those of the East Asian countries at the beginning of their manufacturing export 
take-offs.36 
 
A somewhat more persuasive line of reasoning seeks to answer the question using 
micro-foundations.  In other words, instead of asking why aren’t African countries 
exporting more manufactures, the more interesting question is why are African firms not 
exporting more manufactures?  This line of investigation examines the different factors 
which influence a firm’s ability to export and compete internationally.  Within the same 
industry, African firms are far from homogenous: data shows the variation in 
productivity to be significantly higher than for similar industries in East Asia.37  Further, 
within an industry, the propensity to export depends on firm-specific factors.38   
 
So what constrains African manufacturing firms?  Manufacturing tends to be relatively 
capital intensive, so credit constraints are important to consider.  Wood and Mayer 
(2001) argue that capital is so mobile today that access to credit depends only on the 
profitability of the given enterprise.39  However, many empirical findings show this to 
be overly simplistic.  Capital markets in Africa tend to be quite shallow and information 
asymmetries pervasive, making banking more risky than in other parts of the world. 
Indeed, the leading constraint cited by company managers in the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys is financing.40  Bigsten et al. (2003) examine firm-level surveys and 
show  that  one-third  of  firms  are  credit  constrained,  and  the  size  of  the  firm  is  a  
significant and positive predictor of access to credit (i.e. micro and small firms are the 
most likely to be constrained by credit).41   Further, Habyarimana (2004) finds that 
Ugandan firms which lost a banking relationship due to an exogenous shock (in this 
case, several high-profile bank bankruptcies) showed average growth rates 2 to 4 
percentage points lower than those of unaffected firms.42 
 
In  terms  of  the  other  key  input,  labor,  most  findings  show  that  labor  unit  costs  are  
smaller in Africa than in East Asia, even when accounting for productivity differences.43  
                                                             
36 Johnson, Ostrey and Subramanian (2007),  p. 24 
37 Söderbom (2001) 
38 Bigsten et al (1999),  p.66 
39 Wood and Mayer (2001), p- 372 
40 Bigsten and Södebom. p.8 
41 Bigsten et al (2003). p. 11 
42 Bigsten et al. (2003). p.12   
43 Teal (1999), Cadot and Nasir (2001), Gelb and Tidrick (2000) 
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However, firm heterogeneity rears its head: smaller firms pay significantly lower wages 
than  large  firms.   Bigsten  et  al.  (2003)  cite  the  case  of  Ghana  where  a  firm  with  350  
employees could reduce its total costs by 20-25% if it faced the same unit labor costs as 
a firm with 20 employees.44   
 
Economists often cite the importance of skilled labor in modern manufacturing.  Wood 
and Benge (1997) find that the low ratio of skills to land found in the majority of 
African countries restricts these economies to the export of raw materials compared to 
their Asian counterparts.  Zeufack (2000) refutes these claims, citing methodological 
identification issues.  Instead of looking at aggregated data, Zeufack uses firm-level 
observations from Ghana, Kenya and India and finds that skills cannot explain export 
performance differences.  Rather, he argues that differences in institutional quality and 
rule  of  law  have  robust  explanatory  power.45   Indeed, this is a broad trend in the 
development literature: modeling must rely more on disaggregated micro-level 
assumptions, rather than assuming heterogeneity among firms (see e.g. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2004)). 
 
Further, there are important indirect costs which must be addressed.  Africa, on average, 
suffers from the weakest infrastructure in the world.  Paved road density in Africa’s low 
income countries is less than a quarter of the average in similar countries in the 
developing world.46 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate than an additional 
60,000 to 100,000 km of roads is needed to connect the continent and its vital ports.47  
Bigsten and Söderbom argue that the prevalence of small scale manufacturing in Africa 
is due to the poor transport infrastructure which skews the economic rationale towards 
localized production.  Limão and Venables (2001) find that improving Africa’s 
transport infrastructure would significantly boost both intra and inter- continental trade.  
Clarke (2005) finds weak evidence for the quality of domestic transport infrastructure to 
be a constraint to exports, though he points out that land-locked countries (which tend to 
have higher transport costs) on average export less than coastal countries.48  The Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic identified power as “by far Africa’s largest 
                                                             
44 Bigsten et al. (2003). p.15 
45 Zeufack (2000), p. 277 
46 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010), p.212 
47 Ibid,  p. 214 
48 Clarke (2005), p.22 
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infrastructure challenge.”49 Lack of a reliable power grid is a commonly cited constraint 
to manufacturing on the continent.  Power outages tend be significantly more frequent 
in Africa than East Asia, and many firms rely on privately produced power, which can 
be up to ten times the cost of the public utility. 50   47% of African manufacturers 
surveyed report electricity to be a major obstacle to their operations.51 
 
Government regulation and dealing with taxation and customs authorities, key aspects 
of  the  business  environment,  are  also  cited  as  constraints  to  firms.   In  African  
manufacturing, there appears to be a “missing middle” in terms of firm size.  There are a 
large number of micro and small enterprises and a smaller number of large-scale firms, 
but there are few firms straddling this middle.  Bigsten and Söderbom (2006) argue that 
small firms do this primarily to avoid excessive regulation.52  Staying small (and often 
informal) reduces investment, productivity, and the likelihood of exporting.   
 
Consistent with this, African exporters are significantly more likely to complain of trade 
and customs regulations as a serious obstacle than their East Asian counterparts.53  For 
example, exports take 12 days to clear in Tanzania compared to 3 days in the 
Philippines, adding significant delays.  Government schemes to encourage exports, such 
as duty drawback mechanisms, are also often poorly administered and exporters must 
wait for extended periods to receive payment.54   
 
Manufacturing is further constrained by the weak legal environment.  Contract 
enforcement and protection of property rights are difficult in such an environment, 
making large investments more risky and less productive.  For example, Collier and 
Gunning (1999) show that only in 10% of legal disputes are lawyers hired, illustrating 
the fact that in many African countries, turning to the courts is often not a practical 
option.  Unsurprisingly, Africa scores lower than any other developing countries on an 
index of contract enforceability.55  Further, Collier argues that the tradables sector, in 
particular manufacturing, is the most likely to be affected by this environmental 
weakness.   
                                                             
49 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010).  p. 1 
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However, whether the institutional weaknesses pervasive in Africa are a binding 
constraint to the manufacturing sector (especially in expanding its exports) is not clear.  
Johnson, Ostrey and Subramanian (2007) identify 12 “sustained growth” countries 
primarily in East Asia and analyze their level of institutions at the beginning of their 
growth acceleration.  The authors find that these 12 countries (10 of which relied on 
manufacturing exports for their growth) had, on average, institutions that were 
significantly weaker than those of most African countries today.  Further, they find that 
the quality of infrastructure and level of education are comparable to Africa’s levels at 
present.  In other words, these dozen success stories (which include China and seven 
other East Asian countries) were not necessarily much better off in broad terms when 
they began their rise.   
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3. Currency undervaluation: What does it mean?  How does it 
work? 
 
“Tensions are rising over Chinese economic policy, and rightly so: China’s policy of 
keeping its currency, the renminbi, undervalued has become a significant drag on 
global economic recovery.  Something must be done.”   
                       - Paul Krugman56 
 
Interest in currency issues has moved from the domain of academic economists to the 
common man due to widespread accusations (and as Krugman shows, often anger) that 
China is manipulating its currency in order to promote its export sector.  In 2010, 
China’s merchandise exports totaled USD 1.6 trillion, making it the world’s largest 
exporter, surpassing both Germany and the United States.57  How does undervaluing the 
Chinese renminbi play a role in the country’s success?   
 
According to IMF classifications, most developed countries, from the Euro zone to the 
United States, have free floating currencies.58  This means that the national central 
banks do not actively interfere in managing the currencies.  In contrast, The People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC), the country’s central bank, plays an active role in managing the 
value of the renminbi.  The PBOC buys foreign currencies, principally US dollars and 
Euros, with Chinese renminbi, simultaneously increasing the demand for these 
currencies and the supply of its own currency.  In the first half of 2011, China’s foreign 
reserves increased by an estimated USD 350 billion, pushing up its total holdings to 
USD 3.2 trillion, almost three times that of Japan, the next largest foreign reserve 
holder.59  The effect is that the relative supply of foreign currencies to renminbi remains 
low, making the relative price between the monies higher (i.e. each dollar buys more 
renminbi).  This gives Chinese exporters an edge in global markets, as their prices are 
more attractive to foreign (primarily American and European) consumers.  Exact 
estimates of the extent of the Chinese undervaluation vary and are the subject of heated 
political and academic debate.60  A small cadre of economists (including the World 
                                                             
56 New York Times.  March 14, 2010. 
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58 Gagon (2011),  p.14 
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Bank chief economist Justin Lin) even argues that the renminbi is in fact close to 
equilibrium.61 
 
This chapter looks first at the different measures used to estimate levels of the “correct” 
exchange rate in order to provide a basis for understanding how under- and 
overvaluation are measured.  Given this necessary background, the empirical and 
theoretical evidence for the effects of currency misalignments on economic performance 
are presented.  
 
3.1. Measuring RER misalignments 
 
In a 2004 speech, the UCLA economist Arnold Harberger argued the real exchange rate 
is “the principal equilibrating variable of a country’s international trade and 
payments  .  .  .  and  has  an  extremely  important  job  to  do  in  the  economy.”   Many  
economists are of the same mind.  However, what exactly the real exchange rate is a 
more difficult question. 
 
Whereas calculating a nominal exchange rate is simply arithmetic, estimating the real 
exchange rate is more complex and often a very subjective exercise.  There are 
essentially two approaches to measuring the real exchange rate and any potential over- 
or undervaluation.  The first is based on price comparisons and is relatively simply to 
calculate.  The second method is based on more complex macroeconomic models for 
calculating the exchange rate which would bring external equilibrium.    
 
3.1.1.   Price comparisons based RER measures 
 
The real exchange rate is simply the purchasing power of one currency relative to 
another (or a basket of other currencies).  Adjusting for purchasing power is done by 
dividing the nominal exchange rate by a GDP deflator.  The most common such deflator 
is the purchase power parity (PPP) index which compares prices for similar baskets of 
goods.  The World Bank’s International Comparison Program and the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Penn World Tables are the most comprehensive sources for calculating 
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PPP estimates.  Taking logarithms, the simplest measure of misalignment of currency (i) 
at any given time (t) is: UNDERVAL???? = ln RER?? = ln(XRAT??PPP?? ) 
Where a value less than one implies overvaluation and a value above one implies 
undervaluation.  Rodrik (2008) uses this as one of his measures for misalignment, using 
estimations  from  the  Penn  World  Tables  to  calculate  PPP.   In  the  paper,  however,  he  
acknowledges the emergence of significant issues with the Penn World Table estimates 
and employs other deflators, such as Consumer Price Indices (CPI) and World Price 
Indices (WPI) where available.62  Johnson et al (2009) discuss in detail the issues with 
the Penn data. 
 
Rodrik’s preferred measure, and one used in several other papers including Freund and 
Pierola (2008) adjusts the above UNDERVAL for the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect.  
Assuming that productivity increases more rapidly in the tradable sector, productivity 
gains will expand this gap between the tradable and nontradables sectors.  Increased 
productivity in the tradable sector will push up sectoral wages, while also putting 
upward pressure on wages in the economy as a whole, increasing the price of 
nontradables. Hence, higher productivity countries (high income countries) will have a 
relatively more appreciated currency.  Rodrik estimates this effect by regressing the 
income per capita (and country and time effects) on the real exchange rate: 
 ln RER?? =? + ?lnRGDPCH?? + ?? + ??? 
Rodrik finds that ? equals -0.24.  In other words, a 10% increase in per capita income 
correlates with a decrease in the real exchange rate of 2.4% (i.e. an appreciation of 
2.4%).  Using this ? and plugging in a country’s per capita income level (RGDPCH), 
one  can  then  estimate  the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect  for  any  given  country.   The  
Balassa-Samuelson adjusted estimation for undervaluation then becomes: UNDERVAL???? ? BS?? = ln(XRAT??PPP?? ? ? [?+ ?lnRGDPCH?? + ?? + ???] 
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It must be noted that there is a significant level of disagreement among economists 
regarding  the  importance  of  the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect.   For  example,  Lothian  and  
Taylor (2004) find the effect explains 40% of the variation in historical real exchange 
rates for the US dollar.  Choudhri and Khan (2005) test for the effect in 16 developing 
countries and find strong evidence to support the hypothesis.  On the other hand, studies 
such as Egert et al. (2003), looking at nine transition countries in Europe, find only a 
weak BS effect. 
 
3.1.2.   External Balance based RER measures 
 
In an influential 1945 paper, the Estonian economist Ragnar Nurkse defined the 
equilibrium real exchange rate as the rate which achieves internal and external 
equilibrium.63  However, this is again not as simple as it may first appear.  Williamson 
(1985) and Williamson (1994) introduce the concept of a fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate (FEER), in which internal and external balances are achieved in the 
medium-term and are sustained.  Misalignment is then measured as the level of 
deviation from this equilibrium rate.  The internal balance is achieved when domestic 
output is consistent with the condition of full employment, i.e. non-accelerating 
inflation-rate unemployment (NAIRU).  External balance is defined as the “sustainable” 
capital flows given that the two economies are in internal equilibrium.   
 
Elbadawi and Soto (2005) discuss the issues with the FEER measure and highlight four 
key issues. 64 First, the subjectivity of calculating the optimal current account balance, 
as  this  relies  on  judgmental  approaches,  rather  than  well-established  theory.   In  other  
words, estimating the FEER is a normative, rather than a positive exercise.  Second, 
FEER does not take into account other important medium-term variables, such as terms 
of trade, trade policies and aid/remittance flows which can have significant effects on 
the currency’s value.   Third, the measure does not take into account long-term stock 
equilibrium considerations and lastly, it does not deal with the dynamics of adjustment, 
essentially ignoring the effects of exchange rate and monetary policy on the speed of 
convergence. 
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Clark and Macdonald (1998) offer a model which attempts to address some of the key 
shortcomings  of  the  FEER  model.   For  example,  the  authors  point  out,  the  FEER  
approach does not include the exchange rate as determinant of saving and investment, 
though  this  should  clearly  have  effects  on  these  fundamental  rates.   Clark  and  
Macdonald offer instead a Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach.  In 
this model, the misalignment can be calculated as the difference between the actual real 
exchange rate (ARER) and the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER), given 
respectively by: 
 
????? ? ??
???? ? ??
? ??? ? ? ??? ? ?? 
????? ? ??
? ??? ? ??
? ???  
???? ? ????? ? ????? ? ? ??? ? ?? 
 
Where ARER is influenced by short-term, transitory variables (vector???) as well as 
medium and long-term term fundamentals (??? and ???),  while ERER  is affected only 
by the former.   
 
In its exchange rate assessments, the IMF uses three measures, based largely on the 
FEER model.65  In section six, this paper will present the most recent IMF estimates of 
the alignment of Africa’s currencies using primarily these three approaches. 
 
Macroeconomic Balance (MB) approach 
 
This approach uses country-specific elasticties of the current account with respect to the 
real exchange rate (i.e. how imports and exports respond to changes in the RER) to 
calculate what rate would bring the current account into equilibrium in the medium term.  
The difference between this rate and the current market rate gives the estimated 
misalignment.   
 
Econometric models are used to project the current account into the medium term, most 
often the next five-year period.  A number of factors affect the current balance and are 
included in the models.  Fiscal balance and foreign reserve levels, oil balance (net 
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importer vs. exporter), demographics, economic growth and role of external finance in 
the economy all affect the current account through various channels.  For example, 
demographics can influence the current account as an ageing population puts downward 
pressure on the savings rate and consequently the current account.  A country’s oil 
balance will affect the amount it will need to either commit in foreign reserves to 
purchase energy on the market if it is a net importer or the inflow of foreign currency if 
it is a net exporter.   
 
This projection of the medium-term current account is then used to calculate what level 
of exchange rate would bring external equilibrium (i.e. a current account balance of 
zero).  The elasticity of the current account with respect to the RER (???) is calculated 
using a weighted average of the import and export elasticties with respect to RER: 
 
??? = ????? × ?????????? ? ? ((???? ? 1) × ?????????? ) 
 
The more open the economy, the smaller the exchange rate adjustments will need to be 
in order to achieve equilibrium.   
 
Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (ERER) approach 
 
The ERER approach looks to model RER behavior with macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Variables such as net foreign assets (NFA), productivity differentials between the 
tradable and the non-tradable sector (to quantify the Balassa- Samuelson effect 
discussed earlier), commodity terms of trade, government consumption and price 
controls  have  differing  effects  on  the  real  exchange  rate.   High  net  foreign  assets  (i.e.  
being a net creditor) “afford” the country the possibility of an appreciated currency as 
there is less pressure to boost the export sector in order to generate foreign currency to 
service  external  liabilities.   Commodity  terms  of  trade,  the  weighted  average  of  main  
commodity exports vs. imports, affect the real exchange rate through real income affects.  
Government consumption tends to be channeled toward non-tradables, hence an 
increase in consumption would likely result in an increase in the relative price of non-
tradables to tradables, hence appreciating the currency. 
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Once these effects are modeled econometrically, the real exchange rate which would 
bring the economy into external equilibrium in the medium term (again, a zero current 
account  balance)  can  be  estimated.   The  misalignment  is  then  simply  the  difference  
between the actual prevailing rate and this equilibrium rate. 
 
External Sustainability (ES) approach  
 
The external sustainability approach seeks to estimate the real exchange rate which 
would bring the current account balance to a given benchmark level over the medium 
term.  This benchmark level is calculated as one which would stabilize the country’s net 
foreign assets position and depends on a few fundamentals, namely the current NFA 
position, projected economic growth and the rate of return on domestic and foreign 
assets.   Calculating  the  RER  which  would  achieve  this  benchmark  is  then  calculated  
using the macroeconomic balance approach outlined earlier.   
 
3.2. Why is overvaluation bad for economic growth? 
 
Though the rhetoric has entered the public domain in the last few years, the role of 
undervaluation in economic policy of developing countries extends back much further.  
However, the positive effect of an undervalued exchange rate is not uncontroversial 
among economists, and in this section the paper will analyze recent thinking. 
 
Before turning to the more contentious links between undervaluation and economic 
performance,  let  us  examine  the  broad  economic  consensus  on  why  an  overvalued  
currency hampers economic growth.  Empirical evidence is relatively consistent in 
showing a significantly negative correlation between an overvalued currency and 
economic growth.  Using cross-country data on 93 countries from 1975-1993, Razin 
and Collins (1997) find that an overvaluation of a country’s real exchange rate (RER) of 
10% is associated with a reduction in the growth of per capita output of 0.6%.66  Aghion 
et al (2006) find real exchange rate overvaluation to be negatively correlated to 
productivity growth, especially in countries with shallow financial markets (e.g. Africa).  
Looking  at  a  similarly  large  country  sample  as  Razin  and  Collins,  but  over  a  
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significantly longer period (1960-2000), the authors find that a 20% overvaluation is 
associated with 0.2% reduction in annual productivity growth.  The manufacturing 
tradable sector, which is negatively affected by an overvalued currency, tends to be a 
key source of productivity advances for developing countries as they are engaged in the 
competitive nature of the global market and often can benefit from increased 
technological knowhow (i.e. learning by exporting effects, as discussed earlier).   
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2011) examine the effects of foreign aid inflows on the 
competitiveness of manufacturing exports.  The authors’ analysis shows a negative and 
robust correlation between manufacturing and aid (as shares of GDP).  The mechanism 
behind this correlation, the paper argues, is exchange rate overvaluation.  Aid inflows 
increase the relative price of nontradables, resulting in the appreciation of the currency.  
The “excess” real exchange rate appreciation dampens the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing export sector; hence we see a decline in the share of manufacturing in the 
economy. Rajan and Subramanian’s empirical work shows that a one percentage point 
increase in excess appreciation (i.e. overvaluation) reduces average growth in the 
exportable sector by 0.2%.67  The authors conclude: “manufacturing exports provided 
the vehicle for their [fast-growing developing countries] growth take-off, so any adverse 
effects on such exports should prima facie be a cause for concern.”68 
 
An overvalued exchange rate can hurt an economy through several other important 
channels. 69   First, an overvalued exchange rate makes imports relatively cheaper, 
making import-competing firms less competitive.  This often results in lobbying on the 
part of these firms to increase trade protections (tariffs and quotas), closing the economy 
to international competition and reducing access to foreign inputs and technologies 
(often vital for manufacturing machinery).  More broadly, the losers in a move away 
from an overvalued currency are often what John Williamson describes as the “urban 
salariat”, primarily government workers and other urban consumers in which “political 
power tends to be concentrated.”70  Such a vested interest seeks to protect its short term 
interests  at  a  significant  cost  to  the  growth  of  the  broader  economy.   Second,  
governments often have to follow tight monetary policy to maintain the overvaluation, 
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70 Williamson (1997),  p.30 
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resulting in increased costs in borrowing for firms and an overall downturn in the 
economy  (or  worse,  severe  recession).   Lastly,  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  the  
overvaluation may push domestic investors to send their capital abroad, fearing an 
eminent depreciation.  Indeed, currency crises have most often been preceded by a 
persistent overvaluation.71 
 
3.3. Undervaluation: good or bad? 
 
The evidence, both theoretical and empirical, for the harmful nature of currency 
overvaluation is clear.  This begs the important question: if an overvalued exchange rate 
is  bad  for  manufacturing  exports  (and  economic  growth),  is  an  undervalued  exchange  
rate good?  On this there is much less consensus.   
 
Many economists contend that any exchange misalignment is deleterious as economic 
agents receive distorted price signals.  Just as real exchange overvaluation can lead to 
current account deficits and fiscal instability, an undervalued exchange rate can drive 
inflation and the overheating of an economy.72  Aguirre and Calderon (2005) look at 
data for 60 countries from 1965-2003 and find that misalignment in either direction has 
an adverse effect on growth, though with the caveat that small levels of undervaluation 
(misalignment of less than 12%) are correlated with positive growth.73 
 
Other economists accept that an undervalued currency can drive export competitiveness, 
though only in the short term and depends on getting a number of other policy variables 
right.  Eichengreen (2008) argues that an undervalued exchange rate can be an 
important  facilitating  condition  for  growth,  but  cannot  act  as  a  “substitute  for  the  
presence of a disciplined workforce, high savings, or a foreign-friendly investment.”74  
Eichengreen also argues that a prolonged undervaluation may tilt the economy too far in 
favor of the export-sector, at the expense of non-export regions within a country, 
creating domestic imbalances (not to mention international tensions, e.g. US vs. China).   
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However, there is a strong body of empirical evidence, which points to undervaluation 
playing a key role in the economic development experience in the post-war period, 
particularly in East Asia.  Perhaps the most vocal proponent of this line of thinking is 
the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik.  Using panel data on growth for 188 countries from 
1950 to 2004, Rodrik (2008) finds undervaluation to be a significant explanatory 
variable in growth regressions, though only for developing countries (defined as per 
capita incomes of less than USD 6000).  For developing countries, he finds that a 50% 
undervaluation (see section 3.2 for different measures of undervaluation) correlates with 
a 1.3% increase in per capita income growth.75  Moreover, Rodrik highlights the robust 
effect of undervaluation in the structural transformation of an economy. His analysis 
shows the same 50% undervaluation correlates with an increase in the share of industry 
in total employment by 2.1 percentage points.  This is a relatively large shift given 
industrial employment typically accounts for about 20% of total employment in 
developing countries.76  Section four will look at the mechanisms, which Rodrik argues, 
connect the correlation.   
 
In response to Rodrik’s paper, Woodford (2009) airs some skepticism which is 
important to address.  On the empirical front, Woodford points out that Rodrik’s cut-off 
of USD 6000 for developing countries is somewhat arbitrary, and re-running the 
regressions with a cut-off of USD 8000 significantly reduces the explanatory power of 
undervaluation.77  However, given the majority of Africa’s economies are well under 
USD 6000 per capita, this is not a fundamental concern for this paper.  More relevant to 
this thesis is Woodford’s theoretical argument.  He contends that increased savings, 
induced either through government or a change in preferences, is the key mechanism 
which stimulates production in the tradables sector.  The increased production 
simultaneously will increase the real exchange rate (i.e. depreciate the currency) and 
spur economic growth.  In other words, the correlation between undervaluation and 
economic growth is endogenously driven by the savings rate.78   Indeed, Woodford 
argues, a policy targeted at nominal undervaluation would have no effect as prices 
would simply rise to reflect the change.  He agrees avoiding overvaluation is prudent, 
but points out this must be distinguished from pursuing undervaluation.   
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Haddad and Pancaro (2010) voice similar concerns regarding the inflationary pressure 
of undervaluation, but find that a significant undervaluation correlates with stronger 
export performance and growth in low income countries in the short to medium term.  
In economies with a GDP of less than USD 2500 per capita, a 50% undervaluation 
correlates to a 1.8% increase in exports (as a share of GDP) and a 1.7% increase in the 
per capita income growth rate, though these positive effects disappear in the longer 
term.79  Indeed, the paper highlights important long-term concerns in the including the 
inefficiency of holding low yielding foreign reserves, the constraint on monetary policy 
to affect domestic objectives and skewing the economy too heavily towards the export 
sector.    
 
Freund and Pierola (2008) examine 92 episodes of manufacturing export “surges”.  
They define a surge as “significant and sustained increase in manufacturing export 
growth from one seven-year period to the next.”80  The authors find that surges are 
preceded by large currency depreciations, especially in developing countries where the 
depreciation results in an average undervaluation of the currency of 20%.81  In line with 
Rodrik’s findings, Freund and Pierola contend the undervaluation is a key driver in 
restructuring the economy.  Larger undervaluations drive rapid expansions into new 
markets and product lines for developing country exporters, acting as a big push or 
“grand opening sale.”  The authors show that undervaluation speeds up the shifts from 
initial revealed comparative advantage industries (e.g. more traditional sectors) to newer 
industries.82   
 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) examine the dramatic shift of exchange rate 
policy in developing countries over the last three decades.  In the 1980’s, the majority of 
developing countries (especially in Latin American and Africa) intervened in the 
currency markets to defend their overvalued exchange rates.  Following the debt crises 
of the 1980’s and 1990’s, many developing countries have increasingly intervened in 
the opposite direction, i.e. to keep their currencies undervalued.83  The authors’ analysis 
shows that these later interventions have had significantly positive impacts on both 
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short and long run growth.  Their argued mechanism for this growth differs from both 
Rodrik and Freund and Pierola.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger contend that the growth 
is not driven by increased export volumes, but rather by an increase in firm-level 
investment driven by a reduction in labor costs (a depreciated currency reduces real 
wages).  In developing countries, firms are often financially-constrained and the freeing 
up of capital allows them to invest productively, hence driving growth.84  This story is 
however  at  odds  with  Freund  and  Pierola,  who  find  no  evidence  that  the  domestic  
investment rate increases with undervaluation.85 
 
Bhalla (2008) finds the strongest effects of undervaluation on GDP growth.  He finds 
the change in undervaluation, rather than the initial level, to be the significant predictor.  
Each 1% annual increase in undervaluation leads to an increase in GDP growth of 0.3 to 
0.4%, whereas each 1% of initial undervaluation correlates with only a 0.01% increase 
in the growth rate.86  Bhalla argues that half of China’s miraculous growth in 1970-2004 
can be explained by its aggressive policy of exchange rate devaluation.87  The author’s 
proposed mechanism is broadly similar to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s in that the 
reduction in real wages drives increased investment, though he includes both foreign 
and domestic.88   
 
Other empirical work which corroborate the positive link between undervaluation and 
economic performance include Gala (2007), Berg and Miao (2010), and MacDonald 
and Vieira (2010).  Korinek and Serven (2010) develop a dynamic welfare model which 
illustrates the effects of an undervaluation on economic growth based on learning-by-
investing spillover effects and will be presented in detail in chapter five.   
 
Before delving into the theoretical models on undervaluation, it is important also to 
highlight the importance of exchange rate stability on economic performance.  
According to basic microeconomic principles, higher currency volatility would create 
increased risk for exporting firms, and could reduce production and investment by more 
risk-averse agents in a scenario with limited hedging tools.  Addressing the question 
with empirical evidence, Sauer and Bohara (2001) find that the exports of developing 
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countries in Latin America and Africa are particularly sensitive to exchange rate 
volatility compared to their OECD and East Asian counterparts. 89   Looking more 
specifically at African manufactured exports - the focus of this thesis – Sekkat and 
Varoudakis (2000) find that exchange rate volatility coupled with significant 
overvaluation significantly harmed the performance of African manufacturers in the 
global market.90  
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4. Reducing the Tax on Tradables: The Rodrik Model 
 
Rodrik’s model is a theoretical explanation of his idea that the tradable sector is affected 
more adversely by the weak institutional environment in developing countries than the 
nontradables sector.  Undervaluation acts as an implicit subsidy for the tradable sector, 
avoiding the problems of rent-seeking and inefficiency associated with a government 
directly picking winners through more direct subsidies. 
 
The model begins with a basic Cobb-Douglass single-good production function (y) with 
two inputs, tradables (yT) and non-tradables (yN), which are produced using only capital 
(k), and subject to decreasing returns to scale (0<?<1).  The quantity of non-tradable 
inputs (yN) is, by definition, determined by the domestic production (qN), while the 
amount of tradable inputs in production depends on the domestic production (qT) and 
the amount of imported (or exported) tradable inputs (b).  The share of capital devoted 
to production of tradables is ??  and ? refers to the net inflow from tradables and is 
expressed as a share ? of the total domestic demand for tradables (i.e. ? < 0 implies net 
exports).   
 
? ? ??????
???
???   (4.1) 
?? ? ?? ? ??[?? ? ??)??]?  (4.2) 
?? ? ?? ? ? ? ??(???)? ? ???  (4.3) 
 
The aggregate production function can now be written: 
 
? = (? ? ?)??????????????(1? ??)??????? (4.4) 
 
Calculating net output (y?), we must subtract (add) the payments for imported (exported) 
tradable inputs.  The payment is a given percentage (?)  of  the  input’s  contribution  to  
output (e.g. when ? equals unity, all of the marginal return from the use of the input is 
captured in the payment).    
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? ? ?
??
??
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??
???
? ? ??? ? ? ? ?
?
??
? ? ??? ? ???? 
?? ? ? ? ???? 
 
?? = (1 ? ???)(? ? ?)??????????????(1? ??)??????? (4.5) 
 
 
The marginal return to capital (r) can be expressed by differentiating the net output 
function with respect to capital: 
 
? = ???
??
= (1 ? ???)(? ? ?)??????????????(1? ??)?????? (4.6) 
 
First, taking the log of r, then differentiating with respect to the share of capital 
allocated to tradables (??) and solving for the optimal share, we find that the return to 
capital is maximized when the capital share devoted to tradables equals the input share 
of tradables in the final production function (?).   
 ln(?) = ln(? ? ???) ? ???(? ? ?) ? ?ln (??) + (? ? ?) ln(??) + (??) ln(??)
? ?(? ? ?)ln  (1? ??) 
 
???(?)
???
? ? ??
?
??
? ?
? ? ?
? ? ??
? = 0 
 
?? ? ? 
 
Let us introduce now the sectoral taxation on profits ( ?? ? ??) which can be used as a 
proxy for the effect of the weak institutions on each respective sector, and the real 
exchange rate (R)  which  is  simply  the  ratio  of  the  price  of  tradables  to  non-tradables  
(?????).   
 
The  allocation  of  capital  between the  tradable  and  non-tradable  sectors  depends  on  its  
respective  profit  function  and  relative  demand.   Capital  will  be  allocated  such  that  
returns (i.e. marginal product) are equalized between the two sectors.   
 (? ? ??)?????????)??? = (? ? ??)?????[(1? ??)?]??? 
 (? ? ??)????????)??? = (? ? ??)???[(1? ??)?]??? 
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[ ??
????
]??? = ?(????)(????)? ???? (????)  (4.7) 
 
 
On the demand side, the share for each sector is determined by the Cobb-Douglass 
preferences (?): 
 
?? ? ???? ? ?? ?
?
???
? ?? ? ?? ?
?
???
???????)?   
 (1 ? ??? ? ???? ? ???? ? ????[(1? ????]? 
 
 
 
Taking the ratios of the two expressions and rearranging we have the demand-side 
relationship between the capital share of tradables (??) and the real exchange rate (R).   
 [ ??
????
]? = (1? ?) ? ?
???
? ?
?
?
? (??
??
)  (4.8) 
 
 
Below we see the demand (DD) and supply curves (SS) which relate the real exchange 
rate to the capital share dedicated to tradables.  The demand curve is negative sloping, 
as an increase in the real exchange rate makes tradables more expensive, hence reducing 
the demand for tradables and subsequently the amount of capital allocated to the sector.   
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Figure 2:  Allocation of Capital and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
Source: Rodrik (2008).  p.403  
 
Turning to the effects of taxation (Rodrik’s proxy for institutional weaknesses which 
reduce profitability) in capital allocation, it is straightforward to see from the earlier 
marginal product equations that when the two sectors are taxed at the same rate, the 
equilibrium above holds.  However, if we now change the rates to incorporate Rodrik’s 
argument that the tradable sector is more heavily taxed by institutional constraints 
(i.e.??? ? ??),  we  see  a  shift  from the  initial  equilibrium (0)  to  a  new equilibrium (1).   
This is driven by the reduced profitability of the tradable sector, and hence less capital is 
allocated to this sector than in the optimal case (?? ? ? ), hence the economy will 
experience reduced growth.   
 
Rodrik’s argument is that a policy which will depreciate the currency will act as a 
second-best solution for increasing the capital share allocated to tradables closer to the 
optimal level (?? ? ?).  A decrease in the level transferred abroad (?) will induce this 
rise in the real exchange rate, increasing the demand for tradables (given the increased 
price attractiveness), moving the economy to a new equilibrium (2).   
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5. Korinek-Serven Model: Welfare Implications  
 
Korinek and Serven (2010) develop a more comprehensive theoretical model on 
undervaluation and growth.  Like Rodrik (2008), the authors assume the tradable sector 
is special in its capacity to generate economic growth.  While Rodrik argues that the 
tradable sector suffers disproportionately from domestic institutional factors, Korinek 
and Severn reason that the tradable sector creates higher learning-by-investing 
externalities (an extension of Kenneth Arrow’s learning-by-doing theory91) and hence 
increased exports driven by undervaluation allow for increased productivity gains and 
subsequently, higher growth.  Further, this model makes explicit the mechanism 
through which undervaluation is achieved, namely the accumulation of foreign reserves. 
 
In the model, labor and capital are used to produce two intermediate goods, tradables (T) 
and nontradables (N).  The two intermediate goods can be combined to yield a final 
good (Z) which the authors assume cannot be traded.  A representative consumer-
worker maximizes the present value of his utility represented by a constant relative risk 
averse (CRRA) period utility function with an inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution 1/?.  His supply of labor is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, and hence 
supplies one unit of labor per period (L=1) at all market wages (w).  He can rent out his 
capital,  both  physical  and  human,  in  return  for  a  rental  rate  (R).   Capital  is  subject  to  
depreciation, at the rate??.  Hence the optimization problem is the following:  
 
???? ? ??? ? ??? ?
????
???
?   (5.1) 
?? ?.   ? ? ? ? ? ? ??    ???? = (? ? ?)?? ? ?   lim
???
(1 + ? ? ?)???? = 0 
 
Using the Euler equation, a consumption growth rate (???) can be calculated as (see 
appendix A1): 
??
????
= [?(1 + ?? ? ?)]?? = 1 + ???         
??? = [?(1 + ?? ? ?)]?? ? 1                (5.2) 
                                                             
91 Arrow (1962) 
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Intermediate goods sector 
 
The ratio of the prices of tradables (??) to nontradables (??) intermediate goods in the 
domestic economy determines the real exchange rate (q).  In other words, an 
appreciation decreases q while an appreciation increases it.  The two sectors hire capital 
and labor using a Cobb-Douglas function with labor-augmenting technology A and 
maximize profit: 
 max???? ? ????? ?????)??? ? ??? ? ??? (5.3) max???? ? ????? ?????)??? ? ??? ? ??? (5.4) 
 
The authors make the assumption that production in the tradable sector is more capital 
intensive, hence (? ? ?).  Their assumption seems accurate as the literature tends to 
show that exporting firms use both more sophisticated machinery and have more skilled 
workers than their domestically-oriented counterparts (see chapter two).   
 
The first-order conditions for the representative firms can be expressed in terms of 
product rent and product wage:  
 
???
????????)??? ? ????  (5.5) (1 ? ?????????????? ? ????  (5.6) 
????
????????)??? ? ????  (5.7) (1 ? ?????????????? ? ????  (5.8) 
 
 
Dividing the first order condition on capital of the nontradable firm (5.5) by the tradable 
firm (5.7), yields the equilibrium condition for the capital market (5.9).  Similarly, 
dividing the first order conditions on labor will yield the equilibrium for the labor 
market (5.10):  
? = ??
??
= ???????????)???
???
????????)???   (5.9) 
? = ??
??
= (???)????????????
?????
???
?????
??   (5.10) 
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The equation for labor market equilibrium shows that the real exchange rate (q) 
increases the more productive labor is in the non-tradable sector compared to the 
tradable sector.   
 
Final goods sector 
 
These intermediate goods are assembled into a final good Z using a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with share ? of tradable goods and (1-?) of nontradables.   
 
? ? ??(?? ?) ? ????????  (5.11) max?? ? ???????? ? ??? ? ???  (5.12) 
 
Firms will use inputs in proportion to their relative price, i.e.: 
 
? = ??
??
= ?
???
? (?
?
)   (5.13) 
 
The relative scarcity of tradable goods to non-tradable goods (i.e.? ) is reflected in a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate.  In other words, if ? decreases, q increases.   
 
Equilibrium 
 
Combining the optimality conditions of firms and consumer, one can find the 
decentralized equilibrium.  Assuming the standard market clearing conditions of the 
labor and capital markets: 
?? ??? ? ?   (5.14) 
?? ? ?? ? ? = 1   (5.15) 
 
And that the entire supply of intermediate goods is used for the production of the final 
good.  Hence, in this case the authors make the simplifying assumption that the current 
account is balanced. 
? ? ?????? ??)   (5.16) 
? ? ????? ? ??)   (5.17) 
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Substituting the above production functions into the earlier optimality condition (5.9), 
the result is: 
? = ??
??
= ?
???
? ?
?
?
? = ?
???
?
??
?(????)???
??
?(????)???   (5.18) 
 
Adding definitions for the capital ratio (?) and labor ratio (?) as the ratio of each input 
in the nontradable sector to the tradable sector: 
 
? ? ??/?? ? ? ? ??/??   (5.19) 
 
Rewriting, we can obtain the sectoral allocations for given ratios (as illustrated for? ?) 
 
?? = ? ??(?????)?? = ? ?????(???????????)?? = ? ?????? ,   ?? = ? ??????  (5.20) 
?? = ? ?????? ,    ?? = ? ????? ?    (5.21) 
 
 
Dividing the optimality conditions for the capital (5.9) and labor (5.10) markets by that 
for the goods market respectively, one can obtain the optimal capital (?? )and labor 
ratios (???) (see appendix A2 for algebra) 
 
?? = ???
?
? ?
?
?
?   (5.22) 
?? = ???
?
? (???
???
)   (5.23) 
 
Note: Given the earlier assumption that the tradable sector is more capital intensive, it 
follows that ???>??). 
 
A consolidated final goods production can be obtained given the assumption that the 
aggregate level of productivity in the intermediate goods sector is endogenous and rises 
approximately in proportion with the aggregate capital stock:  
 
??? ? ??? ? ??     (5.24) 
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In other words, investment creates positive externalities for the economy as a whole 
through spillovers into technological advancement (learning-by-investing).  
Normalizing the units of T and N, then   
       
?? ? ?? ? ?   (5.25) 
 
Given this assumption of the endogenity of technology, the sectoral factor allocations 
(5.20 and 5.21) and the previously introduced final goods production function (5.11), 
one can assemble a consolidated final goods production function for any pair of capital 
and labor ratios:   
??(?? ?) ? ?(?? ?)?   (5.26) 
 
?(?? ?) = ??(?? ?)
?
= ???????????)???]?????????)???]?????? 
? ?? ??
?
???
?
?
?
?
???
?
???
?
?
??
?
???
?
?
?
?
???
?
???
?
???
????  (5.27) 
 
Note: ?? is the weighted average capital share in the economy:   ?? ? ?? ? ?(1 ??) 
 
 
It is interesting now to compare the returns on capital of the individual agent and society 
as a whole given the technological spillovers from aggregate investment.  In the 
decentralized equilibrium, the private return on capital is equal to the marginal product 
of capital in the intermediate goods sectors.  Substituting??? ? ?(??)???, we can solve 
for the private return on capital: 
? ? ?????
????????)??? = ????????????  = ??
?
???????? = ??(????)? ? ????  (5.28) 
 
Here ?? is the decentralized equilibrium with ??? ? ????? ??) .  The individual agent 
captures only a share (??) of the social return of investment and his investment creates a 
positive spill-over of (? ? ??) for the society.  Given the private return, the decentralized 
agent chooses a level of investment that allows for the optimal growth rate given by the 
Euler equation. 
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Moving from a decentralized equilibrium to a centralized equilibrium (i.e. the economy 
is directed by an omniscient social planner), the agent now internalizes the investment 
externality.   The  return  is  not  only  the  private  return  (5.28),  but  also  the  higher  wage  
income due to the increase in technology.  This gives the social planner’s Euler equation: 
 
??
????
= [?(1 + ?? ? ?)]?? = 1 + ???   (5.29) 
 
Given??? ? ?,  the  growth  rate  of  the  social  planner  (??? ) and subsequently level of 
investment will be higher than that of the decentralized agent.  With decentralization, 
the equilibrium will lead to slower growth and hence the authors argue this “creates a 
natural case for policy intervention.”92 
 
Steady state 
 
According to the AK model on which this model is predicated, there exists a steady 
state  in  which  the  interest  rate  will  not  vary  and  the  capital  stock,  output  and  
consumption  will  grow  at  a  constant  rate  (???  in the decentralized equilibrium and 
???  in the social planner’s equilibrium).  In both equilibrium, the social return on capital 
is ? ? ?? .   Investment  (?)  must  grow  at  a  rate  just  large  enough  to  cover  both  the  
growth  rate  of  output  and  the  depreciation  of  the  capital  stock.   Output  (simply  the  
product of the capital stock and given social return) less investment will yield the 
consumption equation. 
 
? = (? ? ?)?   (5.30) 
? ? ?? ? ? = (? ? ? ? ?)?  (5.31) 
 
Looking at the welfare effects, we can plug in the values of capital and consumption at a 
given time to calculate the welfare as given by the representative consumer utility 
function: 
 
?? = (1 + ?)???  ???  ?? = (? ? ? ? ?)(1 + ?)??? 
                                                             
92 Korinek and Serven (2010),  p.12 
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?(?? ?) =??? ? ????(? ? ?)? =??? [(? ? ? ? ?)(1 + ?)???]???? ? ?  = ?
???
?
[(????????]???
???????)???                                       (5.32) 
 
Figure 3 represents graphically the utility curves derived from the above equation. The 
red lines show the growth rates that decentralized agents and social planners would 
choose for a given productivity level (A) as determined by the Euler equations. The 
optimal growth rate is ???  as this provides the maximum inter-period utility.  Increasing 
the growth rate from any rate below this level will increase welfare, while going above 
this rate will reduce welfare as it will sacrifice too much current consumption.  The 
equilibria for each scenario are represented by the intersection of the respective utility 
function and Euler-derived growth line. 
  
Figure 3: Iso-utility curves in (A, ?) space 
 
Source: Korinek and Serven (2010).  p. 14 
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Targeting Problem 
 
The level of investment produced by the decentralized agent will be suboptimal (i.e. too 
low) given that he does not internalize the social returns to capital.  The solution is to 
design a policy tool which can reduce this “wedge” between private and social returns 
(i.e. capture the externalities from investing).  A subsidy on holding capital, an 
investment  tax  credit  and  a  subsidy  on  production  could  all  theoretically  increase  the  
incentive to invest and close the wedge.   
 
However, these tools require the government to have very precise information about the 
economic  actors  and  their  investment  decisions  as  well  the  institutional  capacity  to  
implement any such investment policies.  Agency problems would inevitably be rife.  A 
general investment subsidy would encourage some actors to invest in wasteful projects.  
A more targeted subsidy would also be difficult, especially in a developing country 
scenario, as this would result in the government essentially picking winners and the 
process would likely be subject to robust rent-seeking and corruption constraints.  These 
considerations are parallel to those highlighted by the Rodrik model.   
 
Korinek and Serven present two possible solutions to this targeting problem.  First, the 
government could make up for the low level of private investment by increasing the 
level of public investment (i.e. making capital available to the private sector at the 
prevailing market rate).  At first glance, it seems reasonable this could raise the level of 
investment and hence the growth rate given by the Euler equation.  However, such 
public investment would simply crowd out private investment: for every euro increase 
in the government capital stock, the private agent would simply reduce their investment 
by  the  same  amount  as  he  is  still  bound  by  the  same  optimization  problem.   In  other  
words, an increase in public investment would fully crowd out private investment.  
Further, if such an initiative were financed by distortionary taxes this could actually 
lead to even less investment than with no intervention. 
 
The second and more attractive solution to this targeting problem is exchange rate 
policy.  Raising the domestic price of tradables would target only the more capital-
intensive, tradable sector.  Moreover, private agents would only invest in projects they 
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estimated profitable as they must compete to meet foreign demand, eliminating (at least 
in part) the distorted incentives outlined earlier.  This rise in the exchange rate would be 
carried out through the accumulation of foreign reserves.  Korinek and Serven write “by 
accumulating foreign reserves governments can ‘outsource’ these targeting problems to 
foreigners.”93 
 
Foreign Reserve Accumulation  
 
In an economy with closed capital accounts private agents cannot participate in the 
international financial markets (i.e. lend or borrow abroad).  With such restrictions, the 
accumulation of foreign reserves acts like a loan which finances the purchase of 
domestic tradables by foreign agents.  Accumulation drives down the value of the 
currency as the demand for domestic tradables increases while the demand for foreign 
tradables does not.  This is very much like the situation in China discussed earlier. 
 
The depreciated exchange rate increases the profitability of the tradable sector, and 
given its relative capital-intensiveness, more investment will follow the increased 
returns to capital in this sector and the aggregate investment level will move closer to 
the social optimal.  Suppose the government intervenes and accumulates a fraction (?) 
of domestic tradables, the equilibrium condition for the final goods sector is then 
reduced by (? ? ?).   The  optimal  ratios  of  capital  and  labor  in  the  intermediate  goods  
sectors are therefore: 
?(?) = (? ? ?)?,   ?(?) = (? ? ?)?  (5.33) 
 
In equilibrium, the price of tradables in the economy is now: 
 
??(?) ? ???( ??(?)(???)??(?))???  (5.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
93 Korinek and Serven (2010), p. 18 
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And the equilibrium interest rate is (modifying equation 6): 
 
?(?) ? ??? ??(?)?? = ????(1? ?)??? ? 1 + ?(?)?? ? ??(?)???(?)??? = ???(???)?????)
????)??? ? ???(?)? ?(?))   (5.35) 
 
The welfare effects of the foreign reserve accumulation depend on weighing the benefits 
derived from the increased investment against the costs of the foregone tradable goods 
that could otherwise have been consumed by the representative agent.  Figure 4 shows 
graphically the welfare gains.  The slope of the representative agent’s indifference curve 
in the decentralized equilibrium can be estimated by differentiating the agent’s welfare 
function for constant utility (??): 
 
??
??  ? = ????????)????(?????)????)????   (5.36) 
 
The output/growth trade-off of the intervention is captured by the slope of the VV locus: 
??
?????)  ??? = ??????????)/??  ??? = ???(???)????)????????)????) ??   (5.37) 
 
  
 
 
42 
 
Figure 4: Effects of Current Account Intervention 
 
Source: Korinek and Serven (2010).  p. 19 
 
 
More specifically, the dynamic welfare gains from foreign currency intervention depend 
on  a  number  of  key  parameters  of  the  economy.   Table  4  presents  the  authors’  
calculations with different assumptions about the share of tradables in the economy (?), 
capital share in each intermediate goods sector (?? ?), the patience of the agent (time-
discount rate ?) and the elasticity of substitution (?). ? ????) is the marginal utility gain 
from the increase in growth rate resulting from an intervention ??, while ?????) is the 
marginal utility loss resulting from the reduction in consumption.  Where the net 
marginal utility gain is positive, the last column of the table lists the optimal size of the 
intervention (otherwise a net loss is denoted by - and the optimal intervention is zero). 
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Table 4: Optimal Reserve Accumulation for Selected Parameter Values 
 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ??? ???(?) ???(?) ?? 
Benchmark Economy 
B1 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.96 1 0.50 7.5% 22.08 -16.34 0.28 
B2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.96 1 0.68 14.4% 7.44 -22.77 - 
B3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.96 1 0.34 1.4% 4.93 -13.06 - 
B4 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.96 1 0.66 13.7% 15.24 -21.82 - 
B5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.96 1 0.32 0.6% 14.97 -12.74 0.22 
Relatively Closed Economy 
RC1 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.96 1 0.40 3.7% 15.81 -7.06 0.68 
RC2 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.96 1 0.64 12.9% 5.99 -10.47 - 
RC3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.96 1 0.32 0.6% 3.33 -6.37 - 
RC4 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.96 1 0.58 10.6% 11.02 -9.34 0.2 
RC5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.96 1 0.26 -1.7% 10.35 -5.94 0.22 
Patient Economy 
P1 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.975 1 0.50 9.2% 60.36 -28.07 0.44 
P2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.975 1 0.68 16.2% 21.03 -40.56 - 
P3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.975 1 0.34 3.0% 13.26 -22.04 - 
P4 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.975 1 0.66 15.4% 42.85 -38.65 0.08 
P5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.975 1 0.32 2.2% 40.20 -21.46 0.51 
Lower Elasticity of Substitution Economy 
LES1 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.96 2 0.50 3.7% 9.00 -26.92 - 
LES2 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.96 2 0.68 7.0% 1.40 -24.90 - 
LES3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.96 2 0.34 0.7% 5.39 -35.06 - 
LES4 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.96 2 0.66 6.6% 3.11 -24.94 - 
LES5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.96 2 0.32 0.3% 19.34 -37.12 - 
Source: Korinek and Serven (2010).  p. 21 
 
In the benchmark case, there are net gains from intervention in the two scenarios (B1 
and  B5)  which  have  low  overall  capital  shares,  but  with  the  tradable  sector  being  
significantly more capital intensive.  The authors argue that the low aggregate capital 
share implies large learning-by-investing externalities, while the large difference in 
capital intensities suggests that the currency market intervention has a significant effect 
on the returns to capital in the tradable sector (i.e. there is a Stolper-Samuelson effect94).   
 
In the case of a relatively closed economy (the share of tradables is 0.2) there are three 
scenarios with net gains, as smaller interventions are necessary to affect the real 
exchange rate.  With a more patient representative agent, intervention will also yield 
higher net gains as he will be more willing to give up present consumption for growth in 
future consumption.  With such an agent, intervention is desirable in the same scenarios 
as in the benchmark case.  In the fourth case of an economy with lower inter-temporal 
                                                             
94 The Stolper-Samuelson theory states that an increase in the relative price of a good will lead to an increase in the return to the 
factor which is used most intensively in the production (e.g. capital) and a decrease  in the other (e.g. labor). 
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elasticity of substitution, it is largely the opposite case: as the agent values present 
consumption significantly more than future consumption, he will not be willing to give 
up present consumption to secure higher future growth; hence intervention only yields 
net utility losses.   
 
It is important to note that the calculations have assumed the intervention to be a loss of 
resources, but this is a somewhat extreme assumption.  The accumulation of foreign 
reserves can act as an important insurance mechanism which brings significant 
additional benefits.  Moreover, these reserves can be “cashed in” for imports in the 
future once the country has experienced significant technological development and the 
learning-by-investing externalities approach zero, and hence are not a loss per se.   
 
The model so far has assumed the capital account to be closed, while in practice, most 
developing countries allow differing levels of capital inflows and outflows.  With 
capital mobility, capital will chase the highest interest rate: if the world market interest 
rate (??) is higher than the domestic rate, the agent has the incentive to lend abroad by 
exporting tradable intermediate goods.  As the quantity of tradable goods in the 
economy shrinks, this will raise the return to capital in the sector.   
 
Let us examine the case where the social return on capital is greater than the world 
market rate, but private returns are lower (i.e. ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ???? ? ?).   The  agent  
would export capital given he does not capture the learning-by-investing externality, 
resulting in less investment and a socially inefficient outcome.  This makes a cogent 
case for capital controls in a developing economy.  
 
Similarly, looking at the effects of an exogenous inflow of foreign currency, stemming 
from natural resource revenues or foreign aid receipts, shows such flows can have 
serious welfare implications.  The economy will experience a static welfare 
improvement as a result of the increased available resources, but this will entail an even 
greater dynamic loss as the increased supply of tradable intermediate goods pushes 
down returns to capital in the sector, reducing investment and growth.  Korinek and 
Serven emphasize that what matters for this outcome is not the capital intensity of the 
natural resources, but the capital intensity of those tradable goods that were previously 
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produced domestically, but subsequently imported after the discovery of the natural 
resources.  They conclude that a “small exogenous inflow of tradable resources 
unambiguously reduces welfare.”95  In the development literature, this is often referred 
to as the “resource” or “aid curse.” 
  
                                                             
95 Korinek and Serven (2010), p. 25. 
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6. Undervaluation: Relevance in the African context 
 
 “It is wishful thinking to imagine that the export of manufactures [in Africa] is ever 
going to start without the benefit of a highly competitive real exchange rate.” 
- John Williamson 96 
 
6.1. Money in Africa: Overview of exchange rate regimes, past and present 
 
The exchange rate regimes in Africa have moved over the decades with broader 
historical events.  With the increasing European presence on the continent beginning in 
the 17th and 18th centuries, the colonial powers replaced indigenous currencies, such as 
cowry shells and silver coins, with metropolitan-issued coins and notes tied to the given 
European currency.  At the time, European currencies were linked to gold; hence the 
new currencies were linked through this mechanism to the gold standard.97  Different 
countries had different monetary institutions, with the prominence of national currency 
boards in the British colonies and a regional monetary union in the French.   
 
Following the end of the colonial period, only the French sought to maintain monetary 
ties, with the French Treasury continuing to guarantee the convertibility of the CFA 
Franc (Communauté Financière d'Afrique) to French francs.  The other former colonial 
powers, namely Britain, broke off these arrangements, and the newly independent 
countries created their own currencies and central banks.   
 
The CFA zone lives on today, made up of 12 former French colonies together with 
Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.  The 14 member states are split into two 
theoretically separate currency zones (the West African CFA Franc and the Central 
African CFA Franc) each with a separate central bank, though the currencies are 
effectively interchangeable and are pegged to the Euro at the same rate guaranteed by 
the Banque de France.   
 
A monetary union exists also in Southern Africa.  The Multilateral Monetary Area links 
South Africa with the tiny in-land states of Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as Namibia.  
                                                             
96 Williamson (1997).  p.30 
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Besides these monetary areas with fixed exchange rates, many African countries have 
followed the broader global trend towards floating exchange rates.  In 2011, the IMF 
classified 11 countries as having floating exchange rates (see table 5).   
 
Table 5: Exchange Rate Regimes in Africa (as of April 2011) 
Floating (11)  
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia  
Other Managed Float (5) 
Angola, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sudan 
Crawling (3) 
Botswana, Ethiopia, Rwanda 
Peg (22) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, 
Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Swaziland, Togo 
No separate legal tender (1) 
Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Compiled from IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2011 
 
As well as shifting exchange rate regimes, African economies have largely moved away 
(albeit slowly) from the heavily overvalued currencies pervasive in the 1970’s and 80’s.  
The political arrangements in many African countries favored overvalued currencies in 
order to supply the elite and urban populations with cheaper imported goods at the 
expense of mostly rural agricultural exporters.  This practice became unsustainable with 
increasing debt levels and the sharp fall in commodity prices which many African 
economies depend on for foreign exchange.   
 
World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs pushed an agenda of devaluation, 
though African currencies were on average much slower to adjust than other developing 
world currencies.  Elbadawi et al. (2009) find that the median developing country real 
exchange rate adjusted 30% in six years, while it took the median African country 
almost twice as long.  The authors argue that this delay was costly for Africa: “The fact 
that the median African country had lagged behind on this key aspect of economic 
reform must be associated with the disappointing export and growth performance of 
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Africa relative to the rest of the developing world.” 98  Earlier  work  by  Easterly  and  
Levine (1995) find that Africa’s overvalued currencies (proxied by black market 
premiums) cost the continent’s economies 0.4 to 2.3 percentage points of annual per 
capita income growth compared to the rest of the world.99 
 
The structural adjustment programs also resulted in significant shifts in central banking 
across Africa.  Central banks gained increased independence from the government, 
allowing monetary policy to resist political demands and focus more on price-
stabilization.  Interest-rate ceilings were lifted and the commercial banking sector was 
in large part liberalized.100  Summarizing the state of central banking on the continent 
today, Ajakaiye and O’Connell (2011) write: “the majority of countries now operate 
reserve-money frameworks that target a broad money aggregate and sharply limit 
domestic lending to government.”101  Understanding this evolution will be essential to 
examining the policy tools available to central banks in pursuing exchange rate 
objectives.   
 
How competitive are Africa’s currencies today?   Under its mandate to oversee the 
international monetary system, the IMF keeps close tabs on the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of its 187 member countries, including exchange rates.  The IMF 
routinely undertakes macro diagnostics known as Article IV Consultations in 
cooperation with member country governments and makes these available to the public.  
These diagnostics include assessments of the level of the country’s currency, using the 
methods  outlined  in  section  three.   Table  6  presents  the  Fund’s  estimates  of  the  real  
exchange rate alignments for African economies compiled from the most recent Article 
IV Consultation available for the given economy.   
 
These estimates show that African currencies are generally aligned with their estimated 
equilibrium rates, though the majority exhibit slight overvaluation.  Indeed, only 
Uganda appears to be undervalued to any significant degree.   
 
  
                                                             
98 Elbadawi et al. (2009).  p. 7 
99 Easterly and Levine (1995). p.33 
100 Ajakaiye and O’Connell (2011), p.ii4 
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Table 6:  IMF Estimates of Real Exchange Rate Misalignments 
 Macroeconomic balance ERER 
External 
Sustainability PPP 
Angola  (2007) roughly at equilibrium, no specific calculations provided in Article IV 
Benin  (2010) overvalued by 13 to 22% (not broken down by specific method) 
Botswana  (2011) 4 to 6% 9% 11% 8% 
Burkina Faso  (2009) close to equilibrium   
Burundi  (2010) - 6% “modestly overvalued” - 
Cameroon  (2011) 15% -13% 13% - 
Cape Verde  (2010) 9% -13% 6% - 
CAR  (2010) appropriately valued  
Chad  (2011) REER broadly in line with fundamentals though non-oil  REER overvalued by 15% 
Comoros  (2011) 2% 8% 22% 10% 
Congo  (2010) REER broadly in line with fundamentals 
Congo, D.R.  (2009) No significant misalignment (though limited data quality) 
Eq. Guinea  (2010) No explicit RER assessment 
Eritrea   No assessment    
Ethiopia  (2010) 10% 7% equilibrium - 
Gabon  (2010) broadly in line with fundamentals 
Gambia  (2010) 11% 5 to 7% 8 to 11%  
Ghana  (2011) 2 to 5% - 2 to 5% - 
Guinea  (2007) relative equilibrium and reflects changes in fundamentals 
Guinea-Bissau  (2010) -3% - -3% - 
Kenya  (2009) - -3% -6% - 
Lesotho  (2008) overvaluation of 5 to 11% (though must be read with caution) 
Liberia  (2010) 12 to 15% - 8% - 
Madagascar  (2007) broadly in line with macroeconomic fundamentals 
Malawi  (2009) 14% 5% 18% - 
Mali  (2010) 8 to 16% - 9% - 
Mauritania  (2009) 3% 11% 7% - 
Mauritius  (2011) 12% 8% 12% - 
Mozambique  (2011) 0.5% -4% -1% - 
Namibia  (2010) 6% 2% 5%  
Niger  (2011) 2% -6% 6% - 
Nigeria  (2010) 14% 2% 15% - 
Rwanda  (2010) -3% -1% -11% - 
Sao Tome  (2003) broadly in line with fundamentals 
Senegal  (2010) 5% equilibrium 8% - 
Seychelles  (2010) 1 to 11% -7 to -11% equilibrium - 
Sierra Leone  (2010) equilibrium 1% 3% - 
Somalia   no Article IV assessment  
South Africa  (2011) 14% 20% equilibrium - 
Sudan  (2010) estimated to be near equilibrium  
South Sudan   no Article IV assessment   
Swaziland  (2010) 18% 20 to 25% 16% - 
Tanzania  (2011) 3% 4% 7% - 
Togo  (2011) 2% -3% 2% - 
Uganda  (2008) -9% - -4 to -27% - 
Zambia  (2009) 9% 17% -15% - 
Zimbabwe  (2011) dollarized, no separate national currency 
Source: Compiled from IMF Article IV Consultations 
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Looking at the volatility of exchange rates, African currencies experienced extended 
periods of high volatility in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, with a significant move 
towards more stability beginning in the late 1990’s.102  However, the recent financial 
crisis has again brought increased exchange rate volatility to the region, with significant 
increases in volatility in many key currencies (see figure 5).   
 
Figure 5:  Exchange Rate Volatility for Select African Currencies 
 
Source: Ben Ltaifa et al. (2009), p. 6  
 
 
6.2. Going under: Examining the prospects for undervaluation for Africa 
 
The premise of the Rodrik model presented in chapter four is that the tradable sector is 
more subject to market imperfections such as a weak contracting environment than the 
nontradable sector.  Given exporting firms tend to be relatively larger than their 
nontradable counterparts (which includes the vast majority of informal sector firms), 
this premise seems quite reasonable for the African context.  Further, given the need of 
exporters to negotiate through a myriad of customs, infrastructure and other institutional 
obstacles (as discussed in chapter two), it seems there is a cogent case for such an 
intervention in theory. 
 
Haddad and Pancaro (2010) point out that most developing countries manage their 
currencies  to  one  degree  or  another  and  that  exchange  rates  are  largely  driven  by  
                                                             
102 Clark et al. 2004, p. 35 
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economic policies rather than by market fluctuations.  If African policymakers decided 
to follow the route of explicit currency undervaluation, how would they go about it?   
 
The  primary  tool  for  currency  undervaluation  is  the  accumulation  of  foreign  reserves.   
As highlighted earlier in the case of China, a central bank can pursue targeted 
interventions in the foreign exchange markets, actively purchasing foreign currencies 
and holding them as reserves.  Again, this makes the tradable sector more competitive 
and drives investment to the sector.  The findings of the Korinek-Serven model point to 
foreign reserve accumulation as having net welfare gains for economies with a) 
relatively low capital shares, but with the tradable sector being significantly more 
capital-intensive, b) lower levels of trade and c) higher patience (i.e. lower inter-
temporal elasticity of demand).   
 
Do  African  economies  fit  such  optimal  parameters?   Kalemli-Ozcan  and  Sorenson  
(2011) use firm-level data from a large sample of African firms from across the 
continent to calculate the capital-labor ratio.  They find the average ratio to be less than 
half of the German average, indicating that on average, African firms are much less 
capital intensive than their developed country counterparts.  Interestingly, the variance 
in the capital-labor ratios is much higher among African firms, illustrating the relative 
firm heterogeneity discussed in chapter two.103   
 
Looking at differences within sectors, Arellano et al (2009) argue that the capital share 
in the tradable sector is actually significantly lower than in the nontradable sector.  
Using Cote d’Ivoire as a benchmark, the authors calculate a capital share of 0.3 for the 
tradable sector compared to 0.5 for the nontradable sector.  Their premise is that low-
income countries tend to export labor-intensive goods, mainly agricultural commodities 
for the case of Africa, while nontradable infrastructure projects are very capital-
intensive. 104   Unfortunately, data on the tradable sectors of other countries is not 
available  and  hence  it  is  difficult  to  conclude  whether  this  parameter  is  a  reliable  
estimate for the continent as a whole.  Indeed, it seems difficult to imagine one country-
specific estimate can be generalized for such a diverse continent and many countries 
with more manufacturing-based economies may have significantly different capital 
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share ratios, hence making foreign exchange accumulation more attractive.  What is 
clear is that economies which begin to move up the value chain in terms of exports (e.g. 
from unrefined agricultural commodities to light manufacturing/processing) will begin 
to see an increasing capital share in the tradable sector and hence increasing returns to 
foreign reserve accumulation. 
 
In terms of the trade parameter, Africa is relatively open to trade, hence making the 
foreign reserve accumulation less attractive.  According to aggregated World Bank data, 
trade (defined as exports plus imports) equaled 62% of Africa’s GDP in 2010, 
compared to 70% in the developing East Asian economies and 50% for OECD 
countries.105   As for “patience”, this is relatively difficult to quantify in the real world, 
but given the low level of savings compared to consumption in Africa, it may be 
difficult to satisfy this parameter as well.   
 
Purchasing reserves can be costly, especially for cash-strapped African governments.  
As the Korinek-Serven model illustrates, the more open an economy is, the larger the 
intervention would need to be.  Restrictions on capital mobility can have similar effects 
on the exchange rate without the need to accumulate large reserves.  Placing limits on 
capital inflows, while encouraging capital outflows would have similar supply and 
demand effects on the currency as foreign reserve accumulation.  However, as the 
Korinek-Serven model illustrates, allowing capital to flow out of the country would 
reduce investment. 
 
Further, many countries receive and will continue to receive large inflows of foreign 
money, either through aid (in 2009, 21 African countries received aid equivalent to 10% 
or more of their GDP106) or more importantly, from natural resource exports.  Such 
inflows will put upward pressure on the domestic currency; resulting in potential 
“Dutch disease” effects (i.e. currency appreciation makes all other export sectors 
uncompetitive as exemplified by the Dutch discovery of natural gas in the 1970’s).   
 
Using within-country variations, Rajan and Subramanian (2011) find that aid reduces 
the size of the tradable sector through the proximate transmission mechanism of 
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exchange rate appreciation.  Specifically, they observe that in countries with higher aid 
receipts, the export-oriented manufacturing industries grow more slowly than those 
which are typically more domestically-oriented.107  Further, the effects of aid inflows on 
spurring investment are not clear.  Many studies (e.g. Easterly (1999), Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008), Arellano et al (2009)) find that aid has had no effect on investment 
in Africa, rather simply increasing consumption.  Other studies have found a positive 
correlation with aid and investment (e.g. Hansen and Tarp (2001), Gyimah-Brempong 
and Racine (2010)).   
 
More important in the medium term will be inflow from oil and mineral exports.  Many 
top-performing African economies, such as Uganda (which currently has a slightly 
undervalued currency according to the IMF estimates) and Ghana, will see significant 
new revenue streams from new oil production operations. Indeed, both countries are 
expected to attain a production level of 50,000 - 150,000 barrels per day within the next 
five years, generating the potential for national revenues equal to the countries 
respective GDPs today.108  This will put significant upward pressure on the currencies, 
pushing up the real costs of exports of these countries.   
 
Indeed, many countries already are heavily dependent on natural resources.  According 
to  World  Bank  data,  natural  resource  rents  accounted  for  at  least  25%  of  GDP  in  ten  
African economies in 2008.109  Sterilizing the impact of these inflows on the currency 
(i.e. avoiding considerable appreciation) would require the government not to spend 
these windfalls, but rather put them into reserves.  Given the competitive nature of the 
politics in these democracies (e.g. vs. authoritarian China), this seems like a politically 
impossible option for leaders.  
 
Nominal devaluation is another available tool, though only for economies that have 
fixed or crawling exchange rates (see table 5).  To illustrate, let us take the example of 
the CFA zone which currently has its CFA franc pegged to the Euro at a rate of 656 
francs per Euro.  A devaluation of 20% would increase the exchange rate to 787 francs 
per Euro.  This would make exports from these countries 20% cheaper (and imports 20% 
more expensive) overnight.  However, prices would likely adjust relatively quickly, 
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though the government could counteract this with price and wage moderating policies.  
Further, given the political considerations (The Banque de France still guarantees the 
peg to the Euro) a consensus on such a move among the 12 members of the CFA zone 
could be difficult in practice.   
 
In January 1994, the CFA Franc was devalued by 50% following decades of significant 
overvaluation. 110   Van den Boogaerde and Tsangarides (2005) find the devaluation 
returned  the  area  to  positive  growth  rates  and  improved  the  competitiveness  of  the  
economies in the currency area, but these positive effects were short-lived due to 
political instability beginning in the late 1990’s.  Investment, for example, increased 
from 12.5% of GDP in 1990-93 to 16.4% of GDP in 1994-98, spurred by the 
improvement in the investment climate.  However further devaluation does not seem to 
be likely in the near term: in November 2011, the two central banks issued a joint 
statement saying no further devaluation is expected for 2012.111 
 
Summa summarum, a strategy of undervaluation à la East Asia appears very difficult in 
practice for African economies in the current context.   
 
6.3. Beggar-thy-neighbor and long-term considerations 
 
Further,  a  strategy  of  undervaluation  may  have  broader  economic  implications.   First,  
the Korinek-Serven model includes only a single small country trading with the world.  
Expanding the model to include many countries pursuing this strategy would introduce 
fundamental dynamics which could significantly dampen the net effects.  In the 
conclusion  of  their  paper,  Korinek  and  Serven  hypothesize  that  in  a  scenario  with  
multiple countries pursuing reserve accumulation, these actions will result in negative 
externalities on each other to the benefit of the developed countries (i.e. those not 
benefitting from learning-by-investing externalities).  In other words, more countries 
competing  for  the  import  market  of  the  developed  countries  could  result  in  a  harmful  
race to the bottom.   
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African policymakers must also consider the effects of perceived “currency 
manipulation”  on  their  preferential  trade  status.   The  majority  of  African  countries  
receive preferential access to important markets through the European Union’s 
Everything But Arms (EBA) and/or the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA).  These agreements bestow significant advantages for African manufactured 
exports, though cumbersome Rules-of-Origin restrictions among other problems have 
reduced  the  impact  on  export  growth.   Should  African  policymakers  embark  on  a  
strategy of undervaluation, European and American policymakers may push for a 
withdrawal of these preferences, especially in light of the heated accusations against 
China’s currency intervention. 
 
Lastly, the long-term effects of undervaluation are not thoroughly understood, and could 
pose delayed effects to the health of the economy.  Capiello and Ferrucci (2008) argue 
that China’s exchange rate regime “exacts high welfare costs from different sectors of 
the  Chinese  economy  and  poses  long-term  risks  to  financial  stability.”112  The large-
scale intervention by the PBOC (as discussed in chapter three) means large-scale 
monetary expansion, leading to the potential for over investment and possibly a far 
more devastating downturn for the domestic economy going forward.  The authors 
admit the Chinese economy still looks relatively healthy, but these imbalances could 
cause problems in the long term.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In the dawn of the independence era of the 1960’s, Africa seemed like the economic 
rising star, while Asia was mired in widespread poverty, autarky and conflict.  Speaking 
of Ghana, one of the first African countries to gain independence, the historian Martin 
Meredith writes: “Ghana embarked on independence as one of the richest tropical 
countries in the world, with an efficient civil service, an impartial judiciary and a 
prosperous middle class.”  Though Ghana has performed better than most of its 
neighbors on the continent, it is the South Koreas and the Chinas which have shaped the 
global economy and human history, providing unprecedented improvements in living 
standards and opportunities for hundreds of millions. 
 
Success has many fathers, but undoubtedly the growth of East Asia has been led by an 
expansion in the volume and value-added of the region’s exports.  An important enabler 
of this export-led growth strategy, though by no means the only one, has been a highly 
conducive exchange rate policy.  This thesis has explored the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of such a strategy and examined whether this strategy makes sense for 
Africa’s economic future.   
 
The main finding is that this strategy appears in practice quite difficult to achieve given 
the political and economic realities on the ground.  The Korinek-Serven model 
discussed in chapter five provides some guidance on how to approach this question.  
The parameters which would make a strategy of undervaluation through foreign 
exchange accumulation welfare-increasing do not appear to be satisfied in the African 
context.  However, more data, for example on the capital share of the tradable sectors, 
would be useful in assessing developments going forward. 
 
Though the theoretical modeling suggests limited benefits from undervaluation, the fact 
remains Africa’s economies must continue to move up the value chain and significantly 
expand exports on both the intensive and extensive margins in order to provide the 
wide-spread economic growth and standard of living enjoyed by their East Asian 
counterparts.  Since opening up under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has seen 
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an estimated 600 million citizens lifted out of poverty, with a broadening middle class 
and ever greater modern employment opportunities for the swathes of the rural poor.113   
 
A  move  towards  manufactured  exports  could  have  similarly  transformative  results  for  
the African continent.  Improving educational outcomes, promoting technology 
transfers, providing a more conducive investment climate will all contribute to this goal.  
Exchange rate policy must also be put at the forefront of the policy debate, especially as 
many countries will see their currencies pushed up by increasing revenues from natural 
resources.  With an ever-growing youth demographic (estimated to reach 75% by 
2015114) with little formal employment opportunities, Africa’s leaders must look closely 
to the successes of Asia to create the “African miracle” for the 21st century.   
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Appendix  
 
A1. Deriving the Euler equation for optimal investment 
 
 
Utility maximization  
???? ? ??????
?
?
????
? ? ?
? 
Subject to a budget constraint: 
? + ? = ? + ?? 
Law of motion of capital:   ???? = (? ? ?)?? ? ? 
Transversality condition:   lim
???
(1 + ? ? ?)???? = 0 
The Euler equation can be derived using Lagrange multipliers: 
?(?? ? ????? ?) ? ?(??)? ??(????) ? ? ??? + ????1 + ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ????? 
First order conditions: 
??
???
? ? ?(??)? ? = 0 
??
?????
? ?? ?(????) ? ?1 + ?? ? ? = 0 
??
??
? ?? + ????1 + ?? ? ?? ? ???? 
 
Combining: 
?? ?(????)
? ?(??) = ( ?1 + ?? ? ?)? = (1 + ?? ? ?) 
 
 
Plugging in the specific marginal utilities from the utility equation: 
 
?????
??
??
?? = 1(1 + ?? ? ?) 
 
??
??
????
?? = (?????? )? ? ?(1 + ?? ? ?) 
 
????
??
= [?(1 + ?? ? ?)]??? = 1 + ??? 
 
??? = [?(1 + ?? ? ?)]?? ? 1 
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A2.  Deriving the optimal capital and labor ratios   
 
Optimal capital ratio (??): 
?
?
= ???????????)???
???
????????)??? /( ???? ? ??? (????)??????(????)??? ) 1 = ???
?
(???
????????)???
??
?(????)??? )( ???(????)??????????????)???) 
1 = ? ? ?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
? 
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
? = ???
??
? ? ?? 
 
Optimal labor ratio (??): 
?
?
= (???)????????????
???????
???
?????
??  /( 
?
???
?
??
?(????)???
??
?(????)??? ) 1 = ???
?
((???)????????????
??
?(????)??? )( ???(????)????????????????????) 
1 = ? ? ?
?
(? ? ?
? ? ?
)(??
??
) 
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
? = ???
??
? ? ?? 
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